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Abstract
In many economic situations, market participation requires that agents form
groups subject to exogenous rules. Consider a microfinance institution that
decides on rules for diversifying borrower groups in terms of their exposure
to income shocks. Such rules affect group repayment by influencing both
who matches with whom (direct effect) and who participates in the mar-
ket (participation). I develop the key trade-off for conflicting predictions
of extant theoretical models and estimate both effects separately. Group
formation creates an endogeneity problem, but a matching model exploits
the exogenous variation from counterfactual groups. I find that while di-
versification has no participation effect it has a significant positive direct
effect.
Keywords: microcredit; joint liability; risk; diversification; market design;
stable matching; endogeneity; selection model; agriculture; Thailand
JEL Classifications: C11, C31, C34, C36, C78, C57, D02, D47, D82, G21,
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1 Introduction
Economists often observe data on interactions: who interacts with whom, which
students team up in study groups, which characters form entrepreneurial teams
and which firms merge with each other. The empirical analysis of the outcomes
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2 Introduction
of such interactions is complicated by three, possibly counteracting, effects, which
this paper distinguishes empirically using credible exclusion restrictions. To illus-
trate, take the decision of a firm’s top management on the optimal intercultural
mix of the firm’s units.
• First, there is the direct effect of intercultural team composition on team
outcomes for a given set of workers. This concerns, for instance, whether
communication problems outweigh the synergies within mixed teams.
• Second, this direct effect is net of sorting bias. This bias arises if, for example,
open-minded workers are more likely to sort into mixed teams and open-
mindedness (i) is unobserved by the econometrician and (ii) results in better
team outcomes. In this case, the direct effect of mixed teams would be
overstated because it picks up the positive effect of open-mindedness, which
is unobserved.
• Third, a management decision stipulating mixed teams would have a par-
ticipation effect, in that it may result in a smaller pool of applicants and
workers resigning if they dislike working in mixed teams.
The development economics literature on group lending in microfinance provides
a compelling case for the study of these effects. Microfinance has pushed out
financial frontiers in developing countries in terms of expanding access to credit
for low-income households that lack seizable collateral. This has been enabled by
a critical innovation in contract design, namely joint liability, or group lending.
This contract form is both the most relevant in the field and the most studied
in economic research on microcredit. In group lending, borrowers form groups
endogenously. This, the economic literature demonstrates, is socially preferable
when matching is based solely on the borrowers’ risk type. The implications of
matching based on other dimensions are less clear, however. When matching
also has adverse effects on repayment, banks would be well advised to impose re-
strictions on permissible group constellations. In practice, banks operating on the
Grameen model explicitly rule out the grouping of relatives in order to avoid collu-
sion against the lender (see Alam and Getubig, 2010, p. 17). An understanding of
how group composition affects repayment is therefore of very practical importance
for banks as well as for our understanding of the economic theory of joint-liability
lending.
The focus of this paper is on the effect of matching on exposure to similar
income shocks, as is common in agriculture. In this context, both academics and
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microfinance institutions – most famously the Grameen Bank – have questioned
the use of group lending because group members avoid joint-liability payments
when their projects fail simultaneously (see Ghatak, 2000). Contrary to this widely
held view, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) extend two well-established models of joint-
liability lending to show that positive project covariation can raise repayment. The
first, the Ghatak (1999) model, considers an adverse selection setting a´ la Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) where a pooling contract subsidises risky projects. Groups with
socially productive, safe risk types therefore find it less beneficial to borrow and
are drawn out of the market. The second is the (Stiglitz, 1990) ex-ante moral
hazard model, in which group members choose cooperatively between safe and
risky projects. Safe projects are always preferable socially but not necessarily
privately. In both models, project correlation makes borrowers avoid liability
payments. This is because it makes it less likely that one borrower’s project
will succeed while her partner defaults. This, the authors show, has a positive
participation effect, in that it draws safe types back into the market in Ghatak
(1999), and also a positive direct effect, in that it makes choosing safer projects
more attractive in Stiglitz (1990). They confirm these predictions using data from
Thailand. Repayment implications and empirical results are summarised in Table
1, Columns 1-i and 1-ii.
Table 1: Summary of theoretical and empirical results
Upward arrows indicate a positive repayment effect of project covariation.
Ahlin/Townsend This paper
Theory Empirics Theory Empirics
Logit Probit Structural Simulation
(1-i) (1-ii) (2-i) (2-ii) (2-iii) (2-iv)
A. Direct effect
- Stiglitz (1990) ↑ ↓a) ↓ ↓c)
B. Participation
- Ghatak (1999) ↑ ↓b) ↓c)
subtotal (A+B) ↑ ↓b) ↓c)
C. Sorting bias ↑b) ↑
total (A+B+C) ↑ ↑ ↑
a) Negative for low risk aversion or low return differential of risky and safe projects.
b) Negative for low marginal risk types or high liability payment.
c) Coefficients for simulations are taken from the estimates of the structural model.
4 Introduction
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it develops the key trade-off
of the conflicting effects suggested separately in the literature. The negative effect
of anti-diversification in Ghatak (2000) is found to be dominant for a wide range
of parameter constellations (see Table 1, 2-i).
Second, it establishes uniqueness conditions for equilibria in group formation
games with non-transferable utility in finite markets. A unique equilibrium is nec-
essary for the likelihood of empirical models to be well-defined. In the theoretical
framework, matching is on two dimensions: borrowers’ risk type and which of two
external shocks borrowers’ projects are exposed to. Preferences are aligned in risk
type – agents prefer safer partners who are less likely to need bailing out – and
assortative in exposure type – agents prefer group members of the same exposure
type because they are more likely to fail simultaneously and thereby avoid joint-
liability payments. Such preference profiles are also common in other contexts. In
marriage markets (Banerjee et al., 2013), partners have been shown to marry up
within the same caste. Similarly, in study groups, pupils match with more aca-
demically able peers within the same gender. In agricultural lending, there is one
dominant exposure type: exposure to weather shocks. If these shocks are strong,
then matching is first on exposure type and then aligned in risk type (within ex-
posure type). In villages with two lending groups, this results in one dominant
group, which is composed of the ‘weather shock’ exposure types with the safest
projects. This group is in equilibrium because no borrower would prefer to match
with a different exposure type or a worse risk type. The remaining borrowers form
a residual group, which is composed of ‘weather shock’ exposure types with riskier
projects and those with other exposure types.
Third, the paper develops a structural model that corrects for sorting bias ;
implemented in R package matchingMarkets (Klein, 2015b). This bias arises be-
cause in equilibrium the dominant group has, on average, projects that are both
safer and more highly correlated than the residual group. If risk type is partially
unobservable and captured in the error term, then the repayment effect of project
correlation is biased upwards (Table 1, 2-i). The structural model is similar to the
Heckman (1979) selection correction but generalises this model to allow for the
selection process being the equilibrium outcome of a group formation game. The
identifying exclusion restriction for the direct effect is that the characteristics of
all agents in the market affect who matches with whom, but the performance of
a matched group is determined only by its own members. No additional instru-
mental variables are required. This is crucial in a context where instruments are
impossible to find, because sorting occurs with a view to optimise group outcomes.
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The model is applied to a resurvey of the data used in Ahlin and Townsend
(2007), allowing me to model the endogenous group formation explicitly. The
direct effect is a test of the revised predictions in the moral hazard model of
Stiglitz (1990). In line with the predictions, I find a significantly negative direct
effect of project covariation on repayment. This negative direct effect is net of a
positive sorting bias that – if not controlled for – would yield an erroneous, positive
estimate of the direct effect (Table 1, 2-iii). The participation effect from matching
on risk exposure is tested in agent-based simulations using parameter estimates
from the structural model. Varying the rules to either allow or prohibit matching
on risk exposure – but keeping the model fixed to predict the repayment outcome
– allows me to separate the participation effect in my revision of Ghatak (1999). I
find that anti-diversification draws borrowers into the programme who would not
have taken a loan otherwise. However, as predicted by the model, this positive
effect is more than offset by the negative effect of the bank losing joint-liability
payments when projects fail simultaneously (see Table 1, 2-iv).
Taken together, this paper reconciles predictions from the theoretical models
and empirical evidence from Thailand with the literature, which has long consid-
ered the positive project covariation of agricultural loans as an impediment to the
expansion of lending programmes in rural markets (refer to Mosley, 1986). The
results also add empirical evidence to the long-running discussion on group versus
individual lending. They suggest that joint liability is less effective in agricul-
tural lending and that this adverse effect is exacerbated by endogenous matching
on common risk exposure. In contexts where joint-liability contracts are desir-
able, lenders should prevent the grouping of borrowers who are exposed to similar
income shocks.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
develops the key trade-off between the conflicting effects suggested in the litera-
ture and establishes uniqueness conditions for equilibrium matching in non-finite
markets. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data
and presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
There are two parts to this literature review. The first provides a map of the
issues covered in the paper and signposts to connect them to broader topics. The
second presents theoretical models of repayment in joint-liability lending and the
revisions I make to them in the theoretical framework in Section 3.
6 Literature review
2.1 Empirical work
Extant empirical work on correlated returns in joint-liability lending has produced
ambiguous results: of four key studies, three find a significantly negative repay-
ment effect and one – the most recent – finds the opposite. Wydick (1999), Zeller
(1998) and Sharma and Zeller (1997) follow a common methodology in that they
measure the covariation of project returns using occupational heterogeneity within
groups. This measure is problematic because it also captures the cost of monitor-
ing between group members. Ahlin and Townsend (2007) construct a measure of
common exogenous shocks within groups: the probability that the worst business
year in a five-year time window coincides for two randomly chosen group members.
This is the measure I use.
Lab and field experiments
The findings of previous studies are subject to a sorting bias that is well recognised
in the literature (see Hermes and Lensink, 2007). To overcome this issue, exper-
imental methods have become popular means of testing theories of joint-liability
lending. Karlan (2007) makes use of the quasi-random group assignment of mi-
crolender FINCA in Peru to estimate the direct effect of social connections. In
framed field experiments, Gine´ et al. (2010) implement a ‘partner choice’ treat-
ment to estimate the direct effect of endogenous group formation compared to
random assignment. Similarly, participation and direct effects combined can be
tested with ‘group recruitment’ (Abbink et al., 2006) or ‘self-selection’ (Cassar and
Wydick, 2010) treatments that require participants to register for lab experiments
in groups. The main advantage of the technique I develop in this paper is that it
can be applied to field data to test the effects of sorting on specific, policy-relevant
variables rather than the effect of sorting per se. This technique thus allows me
to derive concrete recommendations for designing rules for group formation.
Networks in microfinance
This paper is also connected with the broader issues of networks and network
formation in microfinance, which have gained much attention recently. In the
context of informal village networks, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) use dyadic
regression to identify the formation and determinants of risk sharing in informal
insurance networks among villagers. The main difference between these informal
and formal networks (such as the groups studied in this paper) is that the former
have no restrictions on group size. Restricting group size results in competition for
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places, which both creates the interactions that complicate the empirical analysis
of these markets and provides a valuable source of exogenous variation. From this
viewpoint, the work that is most closely related to mine is that of Klonner (2006)
and Eeckhout and Munshi (2010) on the matching of fixed-size chit fund groups.
The main difference, however, is that the market for chit funds is two-sided in that
it brings together borrowers and lenders. By contrast, I study one-sided matching,
where anyone can match with anybody else.
Structural empirical work using matching models
Structural empirical work on matching markets has a wide range of beneficial ap-
plications. In one-sided matching, these applications range from US school district
mergers (Gordon and Knight, 2009) to Japanese municipal amalgamations (Weese,
2015), which are modelled as stable roommates and group formation games, re-
spectively, in order to understand the determinants of mergers. The work most
closely related to my paper is the analysis of microfinance group formation in
Ahlin (2009). The value added by my paper is that I also analyse the implica-
tions of endogenous group formation for repayment. I thereby add to pioneering
work on selection models in matching markets, which simultaneously estimate a
matching model that parametrically selection-corrects an outcome equation. Such
models have been proposed for two-sided markets in Sørensen (2007), who exam-
ines whether firms are more likely go public when matched with more experienced
venture capitalists, and applied in Chen (2013) and Park (2013). The model devel-
oped here is the first to implement this strategy in a one-sided matching market.
2.2 Theoretical models of joint-liability lending
In moving from empirics to theory, it should be noted that this paper is not
concerned with finding the optimal credit contract. The focus is instead on optimal
market design (see Roth, 2008, for an overview), i.e. how to set the rules for group
formation such that group repayment is maximised, taking the contract terms as
given. I use terms from a joint-liability contract because this is demonstrably the
optimal contract form in a setting with correlated returns and a lack of seizable
collateral. In a moral hazard (effort choice) context, Che and Yoo (2001) find that
joint liability is the optimal collusion-proof contract, even under almost perfect
project correlation. Similarly, in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) adverse selection
setting, Laffont (2003) finds that joint-liability lending is still the optimal contract
when returns are correlated.
8 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework builds on the adverse selection model of Ghatak
(1999) and the ex-ante moral hazard model of Stiglitz (1990).1 Figure 1 illustrates
the sequence of events in group lending. Ghatak (1999) models who matches with
whom (sorting) and who participates in the market, given their group members.
A key result of this model is the homogeneous matching of agents into equilib-
rium groups based on risk type. For this model, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) find
that correlated returns improve repayment because they make borrowing more
attractive and thereby draw safe types (who would not have borrowed otherwise)
into the market. I show that this positive effect is dominated by a negative anti-
diversification effect from banks losing joint-liability payments when projects fail
simultaneously. After loan disbursement, agents decide together whether to gam-
ble and realise riskier projects (Stiglitz, 1990). This decision depends on both
agent and project characteristics. Ahlin and Townsend (2007) argue that positive
project correlation lowers the temptation to gamble and improves repayment. I
show that this is only the case if (i) borrowers are strongly risk averse and (ii) the
risky project has considerably higher returns than the safe project.
Figure 1: Group lending (sequence of events).
A
B
C
D
agents with fixed
risk types
sorting &
participation
AB
AC
CD
BD
CB
AD
loan disbursement
bla
project choice
& monitoring
§©
©©
return realisation &
repayment
Ghatak (1999) Stiglitz (1990)
3 Theoretical framework
This section is divided into two subsections. The first derives the repayment
implications of correlated project returns for the two most widely cited theoretical
models of joint-liability lending. The second (i) establishes uniqueness conditions
for the equilibrium matching used in the empirical model and (ii) derives the sign
of the sorting bias that results when matching is on both risk and exposure type.
1While attention is restricted to these two models, other effects, such as ex-post moral hazard,
may be at work.
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3.1 Revised theories and implications
For both theoretical models I present the model and the positive repayment effects
derived in the model extensions by Ahlin and Townsend (2007). I then introduce
the negative effect of anti-diversification in Ghatak (2000) and develop the key
trade-off.
3.1.1 Adverse selection: Participation effect
The Ghatak (1999) model uses the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) setting of credit ra-
tioning. There is a continuum of risk-neutral borrowers who are endowed with one
unit of labour and no pledgeable collateral. Agents can either sell their labour and
earn an outside option u¯ or borrow and invest one monetary unit in an uncertain
project. Agent i’s project yields an actual outcome of yi with success probability
pi and 0 otherwise. The distribution of risk types is given by the density g(p),
with support over [p, 1] for some p ∈ (0, 1). The expected return E is the same
for all risk types. Under asymmetric information, the lender cannot discriminate
between borrower risk types and therefore offers a pooling contract with gross
interest rate r.
In this setting, Ghatak (1999) shows how the lender can harness joint-liability
contracts in groups of two borrowers to mitigate credit rationing. Under this type
of contract, a joint-liability payment q ≤ r is due in the asymmetric event where
borrower i succeeds and partner j fails. Ahlin and Townsend (2007) extend this
setting to allow for project returns that are positively correlated. This is imple-
mented in the form of a constant ¯ that adds probability mass to the symmetric
events (where both borrowers succeed or fail) and subtracts it from the asymmet-
ric events (where one group member fails and the other succeeds). In this model,
the expected utility of borrower i forming a group with borrower j can be written
as
ui,j = E − rpi − q[pi(1− pj)− ¯]. (1)
Here, the expected utility is given by the expected project return E less the
expected payable interest rpi and expected joint-liability payment q[pi(1 − pj) −
¯]. Because agents have no pledgeable collateral, borrower i only pays q in the
asymmetric case where her project is successful and partner j defaults.
Agents face two decisions: (i) with whom and (ii) whether to take a loan. For
the first decision, Ghatak (1999) shows that agents form groups that are homoge-
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neous in risk type such that pi = pj. This follows from risk type complementary
in Eqn 1, which exhibits a positive cross-partial derivative with respect to agents’
risk types. For the second decision, agents take a loan when the expected utility
ui,j exceeds that of the outside option u¯. Because the cost of borrowing, i.e. the
expected repayment, is strictly increasing in risk type, there is a marginal type pˆ
that solves the participation equation
E − rpˆ− q[pˆ(1− pˆ)− ¯] = u¯ (2)
with equality. Credit is rationed as borrowers with projects safer than pˆ do not
find it profitable to borrow. Ahlin and Townsend (2007) argue here that increasing
the project correlation mitigates credit rationing and thereby has a positive effect
on the repayment to the bank. The intuition for this result is that higher ¯
increases borrowers’ utility by avoiding liability payments more often. This is
because project correlation shifts probability mass from asymmetric to symmetric
events. An increase in ¯ therefore draws safer types into the market. This results
in a new marginal type pˆ′ > pˆ and a safer borrower pool with types p ∈ [p, pˆ′].
Developing the key trade-off
Contrary to the conclusions drawn in Ahlin and Townsend (2007), this safer bor-
rower pool does not generally improve group repayment. To illustrate, note that
after an increase in ¯, the new marginal type pˆ′ now has the same expected repay-
ment (E−u¯) as the previous marginal type pˆ. However, the previous marginal type
and all others now have worse expected repayment (by the term q · d¯) because
the increase in correlation allows them to avoid liability payments more often.
Proposition 3.1 provides conditions for project covariation to reduce repayment
when the distribution of risk types is uniform.
Proposition 3.1. Under a uniform distribution of risk types, the marginal effect
of project covariation on expected repayment is strictly negative if either (i) the
marginal type pˆ is smaller than 3/4 or (ii) the joint-liability payment q does not
exceed 3/5 of the gross interest rate r.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition for the thresholds is that for correlation to improve repayment (i)
the marginal types pˆ that are drawn into the market must be sufficiently safe to
offset the negative effect of increased joint defaults and (ii) joint-liability payment
q must be sufficiently high to lure the marginal types into the market in the first
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place. Proposition 3.1 is limited to uniform distributions of risk types. Corollary
3.1 below shows that these thresholds are even higher for distributions with lower
probability mass in the area of the marginal type.
Corollary 3.1. The lower the density of the risk-type distribution g(pˆ) at the
marginal risk type pˆ, the more an increase in project covariation will impair ex-
pected group repayment.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The reasoning behind this corollary is that for an increase in project correlation
to improve repayment, it must draw in considerably more safe types to offset the
negative effect from borrowers avoiding joint-liability payments. For this to be the
case, the distribution of types has to have considerable probability mass in the
upper tail of the distribution.
Prediction for the context of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Coopera-
tives
In the context of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC),
the model would predict a strictly negative repayment effect of correlation. The
BAAC charges a fixed gross interest rate of 109% for small loans and joint-liability
payments q are implemented in the form of a temporary increase in the payable
interest rate. The maximum interest rate in the 1997 BAAC survey was 117%,
which translates as a maximum joint-liability rate of q = 8% (= 117% − 109%).
The ratio q/r = 8%/109% ≈ 0.07 is well below the 3/5 threshold. In addition, the
actual distribution of types in the 2000 BAAC resurvey is Normal;2 therefore, the
predictions derived in Ahlin and Townsend (2007) cannot explain their empirical
finding that repayment is better in markets with higher project correlation.
3.1.2 Ex-ante moral hazard: Direct effect
The Stiglitz (1990) model takes the homogeneous groups in Ghatak (1999) as
given. The moral hazard problem relates to the following cooperative project
choice after loan disbursement. Borrowers choose cooperatively between projects
with different probabilities of success pk with k ∈ {B,H}. Here B is the baseline
project that was tied to the borrower in the previous subsection and H is the
2Shapiro-Wilk, Jarque-Bera and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the risk-type variable (de-
meaned at the village level) cannot reject the null of Normality (N=292, p-values of 0.60, 0.65
and 0.81, respectively).
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hazardous project with p
H
< p
B
. The hazardous project H has a higher actual
outcome when successful, i.e. y
H
> y
B
, but a lower expected outcome, p
H
y
H
<
p
B
y
B
. Information is asymmetric in that the lender does not observe which project
is chosen but the group members do: Stiglitz assumes costless peer monitoring and
enforcement. Group members make symmetric project choices that maximise their
joint utility Ukk, resulting in individual project success probability
p = p
H
· 1[UBB < UHH ] + pB · 1[UBB ≥ UHH ], (3)
where 1[·] is the Iverson bracket. In this context, the influence of project covari-
ation ¯ on the probability of repayment p depends on whether changes in ¯ shift
incentives towards the hazardous project. Using the project correlation struc-
ture introduced in the previous subsection, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) write the
expected group pay-offs, given project choice k ∈ {B,H}, as
Ukk = U(yk − r) · [p2k + ¯] + U(yk − r − q) · [pk(1− pk)− ¯]. (4)
Ahlin and Townsend (2007) now argue that the utility gain from avoiding joint-
liability payment (of size 2q · d¯) due to an increase in ¯ is comparatively higher
for the baseline project, tilting incentives towards choosing the safer project. This
is because (i) the baseline project has lower returns when successful and (ii) bor-
rowers’ utility is concave.
Developing the key trade-off
Again, the modelling in Ahlin and Townsend (2007) does not consider the negative
effect that correlation has through borrowers avoiding joint-liability payments to
the bank. The key trade-off is developed in Proposition 3.2 below.
Proposition 3.2. The marginal effect of project covariation on repayment is
strictly negative if either (i) borrowers are not extremely risk averse or (ii) the
returns of the hazardous project are not substantially larger than those of the base-
line project.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition for the negative repayment effect for risk-neutral borrowers is straight-
forward: with either (i) a linear utility function or (ii) y
H
≈ y
B
, the marginal
increase in utility from higher project covariation is the same for both the baseline
and the hazardous project, ∂UBB/∂¯ = ∂UHH/∂¯ = 2q. For (i), this is because
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the slope of the utility function is constant. For (ii), this results from the gain in
utility being evaluated at the same wealth level. Therefore, a change in ¯ has no
effect on project choice. However, it has a strictly negative effect of −2q · d¯ from
a diversification point of view because it reduces the probability that at least one
borrower is successful.
3.2 Characterisation of stable matchings
This subsection extends the analysis of Ghatak (1999) by endogenising project
correlation and allowing for a group size larger than two. Restricting this model
to the empirical context, with two groups per market, I establish uniqueness condi-
tions for stable matchings when utility is non-transferable. Equilibrium matching
is shown to result in an endogeneity problem if borrowers’ risk types are not fully
captured by exogenous variables. I derive equilibrium conditions that impose sim-
ple inequalities on the latent group valuations and give traction to the empirical
matching model that corrects for this bias.
3.2.1 Endogenous project correlation
The model used in the empirical application extends Ghatak (1999) to groups of
size n > 2 and allows for project correlation that is determined endogenously. The
latter is implemented by introducing three exposure types, A, B and N , which
constitute the proportions θA, θB and θN of the agent population (as in Ahlin,
2009). N -types are not affected by external shocks. For A- and B-types, the
independent shocks A and B equiprobably add or subtract, respectively, a shock
term γ from the project success probability. Extending the model in Eqn 1 in this
way, borrower i’s utility from taking a loan with group G can be written as
ui,G = E − rpi − qpi
∑
j∈G\i
(1− pj) + q
∑
s∈{A,B}
1[i ∈ s] · (nGs − 1), (5)
where 1[·] is the Iverson bracket, which is 1 if borrower i is of exposure type
s ∈ {A,B} and 0 otherwise, nGs is the number of borrowers of exposure type s in
group G and the constant  := γ2 gives the intensity of the projects’ exposure to
shocks.
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3.2.2 Assumptions
The analysis below makes four assumptions. First, reflecting the nature of the
Thai group-lending data (see Section 5), the analysis is restricted to two groups
per market. Second, I treat the distribution of risk types p ∈ [p, 1) and exposure
types s ∈ {N,A,B} as independent. The spineplot in Figure 2a plots these two
variables against each other based on the 2000 BAAC survey used in the empirical
analysis. The exposure types on the vertical axis are categorised based on which of
the previous two years was worse for the borrower economically. The data exhibits
no systematic relationship between risk type p on the horizontal axis and exposure
type s on the vertical axis. I therefore assume
p ⊥ s. (H1)
Third, I assume that utility is not linearly transferable between borrowers. In
models with non-transferable utility, agents always prefer matches with higher
valuations. That is, agents cannot negotiate binding contracts to compensate
for committing to match with less attractive partners. While this assumption
is less common in the microfinance literature, there is no empirical evidence for
the existence of such transfers. Furthermore, the assumption of non-transferable
utility is particularly well placed in the context of group lending, where (i) ex-
ante transfers are not possible due to limited initial wealth and (ii) Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1997) show that incentives are muted if a borrower initially pledges
too much of her future income.
Lastly, for the likelihood of the empirical model to be well defined, the ob-
served equilibrium in the data must be a unique stable matching (Bresnahan and
Reiss, 1991). The existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium can be guaranteed
by imposing suitable restrictions on agents’ preferences. This is common prac-
tice in the empirical analysis of matching markets (see the literature review). I
build on results in Pycia (2012), who shows that pairwise-aligned preferences are
both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique equilibrium match-
ing. Pairwise-aligned preferences imply that any two borrowers that belong to the
same two groups prefer the same group over the other. That is, for an equilibrium
group ABC, aligned preferences would imply that borrowers A and B agree on
the relative ranks of C and D, i.e. ABC %A ABD ⇔ ABC %B ABD, where %i
represents agent i’s preference relation over groups that contain i.
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3.2.3 Equilibrium characterisation
Figure 2b illustrates pairwise-aligned preferences for two groups, M and L. Here,
matching is on risk type p only. This is equivalent to assuming that the measure of
risk exposure intensity  is 0. In this case, preferences are aligned in that the groups
are strictly rank-ordered by risk type (because of risk-type complementarity). In
the following, I refer to the group with the highest risk-ordering of types as the
dominant group L (dark shading) and the other group as the residual group M
(light shading).
Figure 2: Matching on risk type (horizontal axis) and exposure type (vertical axis)
in two-group markets.
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For  > 0, sorting takes place along two dimensions, where preferences are
• aligned in risk type p, in that borrowers always prefer a safer partner (irre-
spective of their own type), but also
• assortative in exposure type s, in that borrowers only value partners of their
own type.
In two-group markets, the existence of a unique equilibrium is guaranteed if pref-
erences are aligned in the dominant group L. This is because no member of
this group will find it attractive to switch to residual group M and therefore the
matching is stable. Proposition 3.3 derives the necessary conditions.
Proposition 3.3. In two-group markets, preferences are aligned in the dominant
group L if either (i)  is zero – or, equivalently, all agents are of the same exposure
type – or (ii)  and the proportion of the leading exposure type A are sufficiently
large.
Proof: See Appendix A.
16 Theoretical framework
The conditions in Proposition 3.3 are reasonable in an agricultural context where
rice farmers are the dominant group (as in the Townsend Thai project, see Section
5) and their projects are arguably subject to intense common shocks. The intuition
here is that in agricultural lending, there is one dominant exposure type: exposure
to weather shocks. If these shocks are sufficiently strong, then matching is first
on exposure type and then aligned in risk type within exposure type (as Figure
2c illustrates). In villages with two borrower groups, this results in a dominant
group, which is composed of the ‘weather shock’ exposure types with the safest
projects (here, group L). This group is stable (or in equilibrium) when utility
is non-transferable, because no borrower would prefer to match with a different
exposure type or a higher risk type. The remaining borrowers form a residual
group, which is composed of ‘weather shock’ exposure types with riskier projects
and those with other exposure types (here, Group M). At the same time, this
equilibrium matching (i) creates an endogeneity problem that results in sorting
bias and (ii) provides an elegant solution to the problem. Both results are discussed
in turn.
Sorting bias
Aligned preferences result in the maximisation of the dominant group’s valuation.
The valuation VG of group G is the sum over all group members’ utilities from
matching with this group, i.e. the sum over the interaction terms in Eqn 5.
VG = −q
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈G\i
[pi(1− pj) + pj(1− pi)] + q
∑
s∈{A,B}
nGs (n
G
s − 1) (6)
In particular, group valuation VG does not contain borrower i’s expected return
E and interest payment rpi, because these realisations are independent of group
members. Group valuation in Eqn 6 is increasing in risk type (for p > 0.5),
exposure intensity  and the coincidence of same exposure types. Equilibrium
matching, as illustrated in Figure 2c, results in a positive correlation between the
groups’ risk type (first term of Eqn 6) and project covariation (second term). Fig-
ure 2c shows the equilibrium matching, where the dominant group is homogeneous
in exposure type (all A types). We can see that the group with higher project
covariation (group L) has safer risk types on average. Corollary 3.2 states this
formally.
Corollary 3.2. In two-group markets with project correlation, equilibrium match-
ing exhibits positive correlation between the groups’ average risk type and project
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covariation.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the resulting matching, the dominant group has, on average, projects that
are both safer and more highly correlated than the residual group. Now, if risk
type is partially unobservable and captured in the error term, then the coefficient
pertaining to project correlation will be biased. I refer to this as sorting bias
throughout the paper.
Equilibrium characterisation
The equilibrium conditions can be expressed as simple inequalities that impose
lower and upper bounds on the match valuations of the observed and unobserved
(or counterfactual) matches. I impose these bounds in the empirical matching
model in Section 4 to guarantee that a unique equilibrium is estimated. Proposi-
tion 3.4 summarises the stability conditions based on bounds VG and VG, derived in
Appendix A. The proof is for aligned preferences in the general case with arbitrary
group and market size. The conditions for observed equilibrium groups G ∈ µ and
unobserved non-equilibrium groups G /∈ µ are equivalent, but they impose differ-
ent bounds on the latent valuation variables that guarantee the estimation of the
unique market equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4. The matching µ is stable iff VG < VG ∀G /∈ µ. Equivalently,
the matching µ is stable iff VG > VG ∀G ∈ µ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The upper bounds VG have a natural economic interpretation; they are the max-
imum of the opportunity costs for group G’s members of leaving their respective
equilibrium groups and joining non-equilibrium group G. Similarly, the lower
bounds VG give the maximum of the opportunity costs of group G’s members
maintaining their equilibrium match G.
4 Empirical strategy
This section outlines the empirical strategy used to identify the direct and partic-
ipation effects separately. I describe what is being tested in the following and how
these tests relate back to the theoretical models.
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4.1 Direct effect
Subsection 4.1.1 develops a structural empirical model to estimate the direct re-
payment effect of project correlation net of sorting bias. The estimation strategy
replicates the following ideal experiment with standard cross-sectional survey data.
Ideal Experiment 1: Direct effect net of sorting bias
1. Announce in each village that loan applicants will be assigned to groups
randomly and make applicants sign up to a waiting list.
2. For half of the villages (chosen at random), surprise applicants by allowing
groups to form endogenously. For the other half, assign groups randomly.
3. Obtain the parameter estimates of randomly and endogenously formed groups.
Call the first estimates the direct effect of project covariation and the differ-
ence between the two groups the bias from sorting.
4.1.1 Estimation strategy
Technically, the equilibrium groups constitute a self-selected sample. The selec-
tion problem differs substantially from the classical Heckman (1979) two-stage
correction. Here, the first-stage selection mechanism that determines which bor-
rower groups are observed (and which are not) is a one-sided matching game and
not a simple discrete choice, as in the Heckman model. A discrete choice model
assumes that an observed match reveals group partners’ preferences concerning
each other. An observed matching, however, is the outcome of complex interac-
tions and conflicts of interest between agents. In particular, borrowers can only
choose from the set of partners who would be willing to form a match with them,
but we do not observe their relevant choice sets. This makes direct inference based
on a discrete choice model impossible, even if it accounts for social interactions
such as the models in Brock and Durlauf (2007) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
The empirical strategy, therefore, is to simultaneously estimate the outcome
equation of repayment performance with the matching game. The matching game
is given by the following match equation
VG = WGα + ηG. (7)
There are |Ω| equations, where Ω is the set of feasible groups in the market.3
3The set of feasible groups in two-group markets with group size n comprises all
(
2n
n
)
possible
k-for-k borrower swaps for k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} across the two groups.
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V ∈ R|Ω| is a vector of latents and W ∈ R|Ω|×k, a matrix of k characteristics for all
feasible groups. α ∈ Rk is a parameter vector, and η ∈ R|Ω| is a vector of random
errors. A group – and therefore its repayment outcome YG – is observed if it is part
of the equilibrium matching µ, i.e. its group valuation is in the set of valuations Γµ
that satisfy the equilibrium condition.4 This set of valuations is the link between
the structural empirical model and the equilibrium characterisations derived in
Proposition 3.4, Subsection 3.2. With V ∈ R|Ω|, the vector of all valuations in
the market, the equilibrium condition can be written as a collection of inequalities
that give upper and lower bounds on the match valuations
V ∈ Γµ ⇔
[
VG < VG ∀G /∈ µ
]⇔ [VG > VG ∀G ∈ µ] . (8)
For the outcome equation, the binary dependent variable is given as YG = 1[Y
∗
G >
0], where the latent group outcome variable Y ∗G is
Y ∗G = XGβ + εG, (9)
with εG := δηG + ζG, where ζG is a random error. This specification allows for a
linear relationship between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations
with covariance δ. The design matrices X ∈ R|µ| and W ∈ R|Ω| do not necessarily
contain distinct explanatory variables.
Distribution of error terms
The joint distribution of εG and ηG is assumed bivariate normal with mean zero
and constant covariance δ.(
εG
ηG
)
∼ N
(
0,
[
σ2ξ + δ
2 δ
δ 1
])
(10)
Here, the variance of the error term of the outcome equation σ2ε is var(δη + ξ) =
δ2 + σ2ξ . To normalise the parameter scale, the variance of η and ζ is set to 1,
which simplifies σ2ε to 1 + δ
2 in the estimation. If the covariance δ were zero,
the marginal distributions of εG and ηG would be independent and the selection
problem would vanish.
4The Heckman (1979) model is a special case where the set of feasible valuations is Γ =
[0,+∞).
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Identification
Interaction in the market makes estimation computationally involved but also
overcomes the identification problem. Identification requires exogenous variation.
In this model, this is provided for every group by the characteristics of agents who
are in the same market but not in the same group. To illustrate, take a market
with four agents A, B, C and D. The characteristics in the outcome equation of
group AB are simply X = (XAB). The characteristics in the matching equation
are W = (XAB, XCD, XAC , XAD, XBC , XBD), and the independent elements of
W are then W ′ = (XCD, XAC , XAD, XBC , XBD). The identifying assumption is
thus that the characteristics of agents outside the match (those comprised in W ′)
are exogenous. Put differently, the identifying exclusion restriction is that the
characteristics of all agents in the market affect who matches with whom, but the
outcome of an equilibrium group is determined exclusively by its own members.
Note that other agents’ characteristics are not used as instruments in a traditional
sense. Rather than entering the selection equation directly, they pose restrictions
on the match valuations by determining the bounds in the estimation.
Estimation
In the estimation, I follow Sørensen (2007), who uses Bayesian inference with a
Gibbs sampling algorithm that performs Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulations from truncated normal distributions. The latent outcome and valu-
ation variables Y ∗ and V are treated as nuisance parameters and sampled from
truncated Normal distributions that enforce sufficient conditions for the draws to
come from the equilibrium of the group formation game. For the posterior dis-
tributions, see Appendix B. The conjugate prior distributions of parameters α, β
and δ are Normal and denoted by N(α¯,Σα), N(β¯,Σβ) and N(δ¯, σ
2
δ ), respectively.
In the estimation, the prior distributions of α and β have mean zero and variance-
covariance matrix Σβ = (
1
|µ|X
′X)−1 and Σα = ( 1|Ω|W
′W )−1, respectively. This is
the widely used g-prior (Zellner, 1986). For δ, the prior distribution has mean
zero and variance 10. For this parameter, the prior variance is at least 40 times
larger than the posterior variance in all estimated models. This confirms that the
prior is fairly uninformative.
4.1.2 Testable effects and links to theory
By linking the structural empirical model to the variables defined in the theory,
the empirical specification of the matching and outcome equations can be written
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as
VG = −q
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈G\i
[pi + pj − 2pipj] + q
∑
s∈{A,B}
nGs (n
G
s − 1) + ηG
(11)
Y ∗G = r
∑
i∈G
pi + q
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈G\i
[pi + pj − 2pipj]− q
∑
s∈{A,B}
nGs (n
G
s − 1) + δηG + ζG.
(12)
The matching equation is the empirical equivalent of Eqn 6. Eqn 12 gives the
expected repayment Y ∗G of group G. In words, the expected repayment equals
the expected interest payment plus the expected liability payment (if projects are
independent) and minus the liability payment that the group avoids due to corre-
lated returns. The final term δηG controls for unobservable group characteristics
through the error term of the matching equation ηG. The error term ζG captures
realised individual or aggregate shocks such as health or market demand effects.
For the parameters, the gross interest rate r is known to be fixed at 1.09 in the
BAAC lending programme and is therefore fixed at this level here. The parameters
q, q and δ are estimated in the model. The expected signs of the parameters are
as given in Eqns 11 and 12. Of particular interest is the sign of q, which pertains
to the project correlation variable in the outcome equation. From a diversification
point of view, project correlation has a strictly negative effect. However, this
effect can be (i) outweighed by a positive effect from mitigating moral hazard (see
Proposition 3.2) or (ii) confounded by a positive sorting bias from endogenous
group formation (see Corollary 3.2.). Controlling for unobservable group valuation
ηG allows me to estimate the direct repayment effect net of sorting bias. The extent
and sign of the sorting bias are captured by parameter δ.
4.2 Participation effect
In a second step, I test for the participation effect of restricting matching on risk
exposure. This effect is estimated in agent-based simulations using the coefficient
estimates from the structural model as parameters. Varying the matching process
but keeping the model fixed to predict the repayment outcome allows me to sep-
arate the participation effect from the direct effect. The agent-based simulations
can be thought of as replicating the following ideal experiment.
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Ideal Experiment 2: Participation effect
1. Randomly assign villages to one of two regimes. Dependent on the regime,
have groups apply under either (i) matching on risk type only – i.e. groups
must be balanced in exposure type – or (ii) matching on both risk and
exposure type.
2. For all villages, surprise loan applicants by disbursing individual-liability
loans instead of joint-liability loans.
3. Compare the average repayment rates under the two regimes. Call the dif-
ference in repayment the participation effect of matching on risk exposure.
4.2.1 Estimation strategy
To estimate the size of the participation effect, I work with the full sample of
borrowers in the 2000 BAAC data and run agent-based simulations to see how
many and what sorts of groups will borrow at the current contract terms under
different matching regimes. The characteristics of these self-selected groups are
then used to predict the expected repayment using the parameter estimates from
Eqn 12. The agent-based simulation follows the protocol below.
1. Obtain the equilibrium groups in the 29 two-group markets for different
matching regimes: (i) matching on risk type only and (ii) matching on both
risk and exposure type. Equilibrium groups are determined using the group
valuation in Eqn 11 (with ηG set to zero) and equilibrium conditions derived
in Proposition 3.4.
2. Calculate borrower i’s expected pay-off u˜i,G from taking a loan with equilib-
rium group G based on the empirical specification of Eqn 5 as follows
u˜i,G = Ei + l¯t
1− rpi − qˆpi ∑
j∈G\i
(1− pj) + qˆ
∑
s∈{A,B}
1[i ∈ s] · (nGs − 1)
 ,
(13)
where l¯t is the median loan size in market t and qˆ and qˆ are the parameter
estimates from Eqn 11.
3. Evaluate each borrower’s participation condition u˜i,G > u¯t, where u¯t is the
value of a borrower’s outside option, measured as the median wage rate for
agricultural labour in that market.
Empirical results 23
4. Exclude a group from the sample if the participation condition is satisfied
for fewer members than the minimum group size in the market.
5. For the remaining groups, predict the expected repayment using Eqn 12 and
the parameter estimates from the structural empirical model.
4.2.2 Testable effects and links to theory
Similar to that for the direct effect, the test for the participation effect is positioned
between two opposing predictions. On the one hand, the Ghatak (1999) adverse
selection model results in a negative repayment effect. On the other hand, Katzur
and Lensink (2012) show that the perfect information outcome can be achieved –
in the Ghatak (2000) model with a binary distribution of risk types – if project
covariation is sufficiently high for safe groups compared to risky groups. While
it is not clear that the result in Katzur and Lensink (2012) carries over to our
context, it still merits consideration when interpreting the results.
5 Empirical results
The empirical strategy in Section 4 is applied to data from the Townsend Thai
project. The analysis here uses data from both the 1997 baseline survey and a
smaller resurvey conducted in 2000. Replication code and datasets are available
in R package matchingMarkets (Klein, 2015b) and the corresponding Vignette
(Klein, 2015a).
5.1 Data
The survey project is a panel that focuses on villages in four provinces (changwat)
of Thailand: two in the North-east region and two in the Central region. The
baseline data used in the Ahlin and Townsend (2007) paper was collected in 1997.
For this study, 12 subdistricts (tambons) were selected at random within each of
the four provinces. Within each tambon, four villages were selected at random.
This resulted in a sample of 192 villages, in which two survey instruments were
applied. In the initial household survey (Townsend, 1997b), 15 households in each
village were selected at random, yielding a total sample of 192 × 15 = 2, 880
households. The second survey instrument was the initial Bank for Agriculture
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) survey (Townsend, 1997a) or BAAC 1997.
The BAAC is a government-owned development bank and the largest lender to
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this population. In the BAAC 1997 survey, for every village as many borrower
groups as possible were identified and a maximum of two groups were randomly
selected for interviews. In total, 262 BAAC groups were identified and their group
leaders interviewed.
For the main part of the analysis, I use data from a smaller resurvey that
was conducted in 2000 and comprises variables that were specifically designed
to test the theory in Ghatak (1999). In the resurvey, for each of the four origi-
nal provinces, four tambons were selected randomly from the 12 tambons in the
baseline survey. This resurvey again consisted of two instruments: a household
resurvey (Townsend, 2000b) and a BAAC resurvey (Townsend, 2000a), referred to
as BAAC 2000 in the following. BAAC 2000 consists of a group-leader survey, in
which the heads of BAAC groups were interviewed, as well as a group survey, in
which up to five group members were interviewed. The final sample of the BAAC
2000 used for analysis comprises the characteristics of 68 lending groups.
Table 2: Summary of group-level variables.*
Variable Description mean (sd)
Dependent variable
- repayment outcomea) BAAC never raised interest rates as 0.46 (0.50)
a penalty for late repayment
Exposure
- ln(group age)b) Log of number of years group had existed 2.33 (0.55)
Risk type
- success prob p
c)
i Group members’ project success prob. 0.41 (0.15)
- success prob int pip
c)
j Two-way interactions of success prob. 0.24 (0.05)
Project covariation
- worst year wstc) Measure of coincidence of economically bad 0.57 (0.37)
years across group members
Contract terms
- interest rate Gross interest rate is fixed at 109% for loans 1.09 (–)
below 60,000 Thai baht
- loan sizea) Average loan size borrowed by the group 17.12 (10.87)
(thousand Thai baht, currency value in 2000)
a) from 2000 BAAC group-leader survey
b) random regression imputation based on 1997 and 2000 BAAC surveys
c) from 2000 BAAC group survey
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5.2 Variables
The variables used in the empirical analysis are directly related to the extension
of Ghatak’s (1999) theoretical model of borrower group formation in Subsection
3.2. The average risk type and project covariation are measured as below, and the
remaining variables are summarised in Table 2.
Risk type: Group members were asked for their expected income for the follow-
ing year, which is denoted as Ei. They were also asked for their expected income
if the following year was a good year Hi or a bad year Li. The measure pi =
Ei−Li
Hi−Li
serves as a proxy for borrower i’s probability of success, using the property that
piHi + (1− pi)Li = Ei.
Project covariation: A group’s project covariation is proxied by the variable
worst year, which is a vector indicating which of the previous two years was worse
for a borrower economically. The group-level variable gives the average coincidence
of worst years based on all possible borrower-by-borrower comparisons. This mea-
sure establishes a direct link with the different exposure types in Ahlin (2009) in
that each year can then be interpreted as exposing agents to a different shock.
The measure of project covariation then gives the probability that two randomly
drawn group members have the same exposure type.
5.3 Direct effect
The first Probit model in Table 3 gives the marginal effect of project covariation
on repayment. The dependent variable is 1 if there were no arrears during the
group’s lifetime and 0 otherwise. To compare the riskiness of groups with different
ages and, therefore, different exposure to risk, I control for the natural logarithm
of group age. I also add village-level fixed effects to control for between-village het-
erogeneity. The resulting positive coefficient suggests that a high level of project
covariation is associated with less arrears. This replicates the surprising result
in Ahlin and Townsend (2007) using data from the 2000 resurvey. This positive
repayment effect can be explained by either correlation mitigating moral hazard
for extremely risk-averse borrowers (see the Stiglitz model, Proposition 3.2) or the
endogenous matching that biases βˆwst upwards because it picks up the effect of the
omitted risk-type variable (see Corollary 3.2). To explore this bias from sorting,
the second Probit model controls for contract terms and the positive repayment
effect of risk type. This control mitigates the sorting bias for βˆwst and results in a
switch in sign, which is consistent with the negative effect from anti-diversification,
as predicted in the Stiglitz model for moderately risk-averse agents (see Eqn 12).
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Table 3: Probit and structural models with market fixed effects
S.E. in parentheses; one-sided significance at 0.1, 1, 5, 10% denoted by ***, **, *, and .
Probit model (1) Probit model (2) Structural
Outcome equation
Dependent variable: repayment outcomea) = 1 if the BAAC has never raised interest
as a penalty for late repayment; 0 otherwise.
Risk type
- success prob pi – +1 +1
- success prob int pipj – 0.238 (1.606) 1.571 (1.813)
Project covariation
- same worst year wsta) 0.170 (0.289) -0.015 (0.219) -0.586 (0.243) **
Contract terms
- loan size – 0.263 (0.421) 0.970 (0.362) **
- loan size sqrd – -0.050 (0.088) -0.187 (0.080) *
Exposure
- ln(group age) -0.040 (0.054) -0.116 (0.161) -0.395 (0.109)***
Village-level controls YES YES YES
Observations 68 68 68
Matching equation
Dependent variable: group observability indicator = 1 if group is observed; 0 otherwise.
Risk type
- success prob int pipj – – -0.778 (0.992)
Project covariation
- same worst year wst – – 0.356 (0.119) **
Controls – – YES
Observationsb) – – 5,342
Variance
Covariance δ – – 0.512 (0.127)***
a) Karlson et al. (2012) one-sided test for difference of Probit(2) and Structural, p-value 0.048.
b) 5,284 counterfactual groups and 58 factual groups.
5.3.1 Matching on observables
The above switch in sign implies a positive correlation between risk type and
exposure type, which results from endogenous matching on both covariates as
derived in Corollary 3.2. To confirm that this is the mechanism at work, the
matching on observables is tested in the matching equation of the structural model
in Table 3. In this equation, the independent variables are constructed from
individual borrowers’ characteristics for 58 factual (or equilibrium) groups and
5,284 counterfactual (or non-equilibrium) groups in all 29 two-group villages. The
dependent variable is 1 for the 58 equilibrium groups and 0 otherwise. The latent
group valuations are simulated for equilibrium and non-equilibrium groups using
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the Gibbs sampler presented in Subsection 4.1.1. Turning to the results, the signs
of the marginal effects5 are consistent with the predictions from the theory in Eqn
11.6 The negative sign on the risk-type variable means that borrowers value group
members with safer projects. (Note: the negative sign on the coefficient results
in a positive cross-partial derivative with respect to agents’ risk types in Eqn 11.)
While this effect is non-significant, the positive sign on the exposure-type variable
is significant at the 1%-level and indicates that borrowers value peers of the same
exposure type. This finding is in line with the matching mechanism derived in
Corollary 3.2. This is interesting in that it suggests that exposure type may play
an even more significant role in group formation than risk type, which has been
the primary focus of the microfinance literature to date.
5.3.2 Matching on unobservables
If matching is also on unobservables that affect group repayment – such as local
information on risk types – then βˆwst is still biased upwards in the second Probit
model. To correct for this bias, the structural model in Table 3 estimates the
matching and outcome equations jointly and allows local information to enter the
outcome equation in form of the error term η of the matching equation. The
variance section in Table 3 shows considerable matching on unobservables: the
covariance between the error terms of the matching and outcome equations is δˆ =
0.512, which is equivalent to a correlation of +0.41 (= σε,η
σεση
= 0.512
(1+0.5122)·1). A direct
comparison between the second Probit model and the sorting-corrected structural
model yields an upwards bias in the Probit model of +0.57 (= −0.015− [−0.586])
for βˆwst that is significant at the 5%-level. This bias results from the positive
correlation of project covariation and unobservables η in the outcome equation
(see Figure 3a). In the case of group lending, this means that groups with higher
project covariation also have better unobserved characteristics. In the structural
model, the error term η in the matching equation enters the outcome equation as
δη¯ > 0. The omission of this sorting-correction term in the Probit regression leads
5The marginal effects for the selection equation are obtained as ∂P∂W = φ(0)α/
√
2, with the
probability P that group G has a higher valuation than group G′ equal to Pr(WGα + ηG >
WG′α + ηG′) = Φ((WG − WG′)α/σηG−ηG′ ) = Φ((WG − WG′)α/
√
2). The standard error of
the marginal effect is given by φ(0)σα/
√
2. To see this, consider a linear transformation of
X ∼ N(µ, σ) as Y = aX. It then follows that Y ∼ N(aµ, aσ).
6Note that coefficient magnitudes on risk type and correlatedness need not be the same in
both equations of the structural model. This is mainly for two reasons: first, the response of the
outcome equation is the probability of timely repayment rather than the expected repayment;
and second, the parameters in the outcome equation are based on the adverse selection model
and do not reflect the moral hazard effects through which correlated projects can tilt incentives
towards safer projects.
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to a positive correlation cor(wst, ε) because ε is proportional to δη (i.e. ε = δη+ξ,
where ξ is a random error). Matching on both observables (wst) and unobservables
(η) thus explains the sorting bias in the second Probit model.
Figure 3: Matching on unobservables. Relative magnitudes of sorting bias and
the direct effect of project covariation on repayment outcomes.
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5.3.3 Decomposition of sorting bias and direct effect
Figure 3b illustrates the decomposition of sorting bias and direct effects. The
decomposition is done by comparing the estimated regression lines for the first
Probit model with the outcome equation of the structural model. The models are
evaluated conditional on the value of wst on the horizontal axis with all other
variables at their means. The solid regression line of the structural model gives
the expected repayment – conditional on wst – when all borrowers are randomly
assigned to groups. This is because the estimates are conditional on all feasible
groups (observed and unobserved) in the market. The dashed Probit regression
line depicts the estimates for observed groups only and therefore also captures
the sorting bias. To emphasise, if borrowers were assigned at random, as in Ideal
Experiment 1 in Section 4, the two lines would overlap perfectly.
In Figure 3b, we see that allowing groups to match endogenously (dashed
line) results in more timely repayment for groups with higher project covariation.
This is the result in Ahlin and Townsend (2007). However, it does not imply
a causal relationship. To quantify this effect, note that an increase in project
covariation by one standard deviation at the sample mean results in an expected
improvement in the probability of timely repayments of +6.3 percentage points
(= 0.170 · 0.37 = βˆprobitwst · σˆwst). This improvement follows from two opposing
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effects. First, from the structural model we find a significantly negative direct
effect of −22 percentage points (−0.586 · 0.37 = βˆstrwst · σˆwst) because the bank
loses joint-liability payments when projects fail simultaneously. This is consistent
with the revised predictions from the moral hazard model of Stiglitz (1990) when
borrowers are not extremely risk averse. Second, from the difference between the
Probit and structural models we find an even larger but positive sorting bias of
+28 percentage points ([βˆprobitwst − βˆstrwst] · σˆwst). This is because the highly correlated
groups have unobservables that make them +28 percentage points safer.
5.3.4 Robustness of the results
In this subsection, I examine whether my primary result – the decomposition into
a negative direct effect and a positive sorting bias – is robust to various empirical
issues.
I first examine a potential reverse causation problem, in that all group mem-
bers may report their worst year as that in which their group faced repayment
problems. This would provide an alternative explanation as to why groups with
correlated returns have worse repayment outcomes. To rule out this explanation,
first note that when borrowers were asked why they perceived one year as worse
than another, only five out of a total of 390 borrowers gave the reason ‘unable to
repay debt’ in their response. In addition, repayment was surveyed retrospectively
over the full lifetime of groups. The average group age was 11 years, but project
correlation is calculated based on just two years.
A second concern is survivorship bias. Groups with safer types are more likely
to survive, particularly when returns are highly correlated. This ’survival of the
safest’ would result in groups with more correlated returns being safer and provide
an alternative to my endogenous matching explanation. To disprove this explana-
tion, it is enough to show that older groups are not safer on average. In fact, the
correlation between risk type and group age is negative, at -0.065, p-value 0.599,
meaning that survivorship bias is not an issue.
Finally, the equilibrium conditions are derived based on the assumption that
the matching data represent the complete market. In the paper, the model is
estimated using a random sample of five borrowers from groups with 11 borrowers
on average. This is a shortcoming in the empirical analysis. However, Klein
(2015a) presents Monte Carlo evidence of the robustness of the estimator in small
samples, which confirms that the resulting attenuation bias even underrates the
sorting bias that this paper corrects for.
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5.4 Participation effect
For the direct effect, the empirical model does not allow for an outside option
leaving in or excluding some potential borrower groups. The participation effect
tests whether allowing for matching on exposure type can draw sufficiently safe
types – that would not have taken a loan otherwise – into the market in order
to offset the negative effect from avoiding liability payments. This is an indirect
test of the model extension of Ghatak (1999) in Subsection 3.1, which predicts
a negative repayment effect, against Katzur and Lensink (2012), who show that
group lending can achieve the perfect information outcome if project covariation
is sufficiently higher for safe groups compared to risky groups.
Table 4: Agent-based simulation of expected repayment under different matching
regimes.
Simulation based on 250 individuals in 29 two-group markets.
Matching process: matching on matching on
p only p and s
(1) (2)
Participation
1. No. of borrowers 165 164
2. No. of groups 17 17
Group characteristics
3. p¯ 0.740 0.723
4. w¯st 0.571 0.639
Predicted repayment
5. ˆ¯Y 0.428 0.390
6. 80% CI a) (0.904, 0.048) (0.905, 0.031)
a) Confidence intervals based on endpoint transformation.
Table 4 presents the results of the simulations for (1) matching on risk type only
versus (2) matching on both risk type and exposure type. The first row gives
the number of borrowers whose utility from taking a loan with their equilibrium
groups exceeds the outside option of wage labour. Contrary to the predictions of
the theories, matching on exposure type (anti-diversification) does not draw more
borrowers into the programme (164) than matching on risk type alone (165). This
result carries through from the individual to the group level: the restriction on
minimum group size makes borrowing infeasible for groups where the participation
condition is satisfied for fewer borrowers than the minimum group size. The
number of remaining groups is given in the second row.
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While anti-diversification does not draw in more borrowing groups (17 vs 17),
these groups are riskier (p¯ in Row 3) and have considerably higher project corre-
lation (w¯st in Row 4). The predicted probability of timely repayment of 0.390 for
these groups is consequently lower than when matching on risk type only (0.428).
This is because under high project correlation, the bank receives fewer joint-
liability payments, consistent with the model predictions from Ghatak (1999). The
effect is statisticially insignificant but of economic importance: anti-diversification
results in a 10 percent increase in timely repayment. The results further suggest
that the predictions from Katzur and Lensink (2012) are not applicable in this
context and that lenders would benefit from preventing the grouping together of
borrowers exposed to similar income shocks.
5.5 Implications for market design
The results concerning the direct and participation effects imply that banks should
prevent the matching of borrowers who are exposed to similar income shocks. A
policy recommendation, however, would depend on whether imposing such rules
would also prevent borrowers from matching on dimensions that may be desirable
from the lender’s perspective, such as social connections. If borrowers match with
those that they know best, then project covariation is naturally tied to social
connectedness because friends or relatives will often have the same income sources
and therefore be exposed to similar income shocks. Taken together, endogenous
matching will result in groups with both correlated returns and social ties.
In terms of optimal market design, there are three cases to distinguish. First,
if the project correlation measure captures social connectedness fully, then group
diversification can be implemented by restricting the grouping together of rela-
tives, as suggested in the Grameen Replication Guidelines (Alam and Getubig,
2010). The remaining two cases are relevant when social connectedness is (partly)
captured in the error term. The implications of the findings in this section then
also depend on the expected repayment effect of social connectedness. If it im-
proves repayment, pushing for diversification may have no effect (based on the
second Probit model in Table 3). If, on the other hand, social connections have
a negative effect on repayment, then there is a clear case for diversifying groups.
In the theoretical and empirical literature, there is no clear consensus on the ef-
fect of social connections on repayment. For the Thai village context used in this
paper, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) find that cooperative behaviour in groups has
a negative effect on repayment. This is consistent with the models of Banerjee
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et al. (1994) and Besley and Coate (1995), who predict that cooperation prevents
a group from exerting repayment pressure on its members. The result from the
survey that most closely matches the context of this paper thus suggests a positive
repayment effect from diversification.
6 Conclusion
I analyse the optimal design of rules for group formation in matching markets
with an application to group lending in microfinance. The particular focus is
on microlenders’ decisions on rules to diversify borrower groups with respect to
their exposure to common income shocks. Such rules affect group outcomes by
influencing who matches with whom (direct effect) and who participates in the
market (participation effect). A distinction between these effects allows a direct
test of ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms through which the variable of interest
affects group outcomes. This distinction is particularly useful in the field of (mi-
cro)finance, where the evaluation of adverse selection models requires that moral
hazard effects are not in force, and vice versa.
I develop the trade-off for conflicting predictions of extant asymmetric infor-
mation models and estimate both effects separately. The empirical analysis is
complicated by an endogeneity problem that occurs whenever agents match on
both (i) the independent variable of interest and (ii) characteristics unobserved
to the researcher but correlated with the outcome of interest. To correct for the
resulting sorting bias, I develop a generalised Heckman selection model with cred-
ible exclusion restrictions that exploits agents’ local information to control for
unobserved group characteristics. These unobservables are inferred in a matching
model that captures the strategic interactions of agents who can only choose from
the set of partners that would be willing to match with them.
This paper has implications for empirical and theoretical work on matching
markets as well as for microfinance practice, and three main outcomes can be
identified. First, empirical studies on group outcomes can correct for bias that
results from sorting using R package matchingMarkets (Klein, 2015b). Alterna-
tively, empirical findings should be interpreted with this bias in mind, noting that
direction and size are often unclear. In the Thai group-lending context in this
paper, the positive sorting bias even exceeds the negative direct effect of borrow-
ers’ correlated returns on repayment, which has led previous research – using the
same dataset – to make incorrect policy recommendations. Second, most theoret-
ical work on microfinance builds on the result that endogenous group formation
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is socially optimal when matching is on risk type. Future modelling should take
into account that matching also takes place on other dimensions – such as expo-
sure to common shocks – with adverse effects on group repayment. Third, for
microfinance practice, this finding suggests that lenders would benefit from ensur-
ing that borrowing groups are sufficiently diversified in their exposure to income
shocks. This may be achieved by placing suitable restrictions on the composition
of borrower groups.
References
Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B. and Renner, E. (2006). Group size and social
ties in microfinance institutions. Economic Inquiry, 44 (4), 614–628.
Ahlin, C. (2009). Matching for credit: Risk and diversification in Thai microcre-
dit groups. Working Paper 251, Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of
Development.
— and Townsend, R. (2007). Using repayment data to test across models of
joint liability lending. The Economic Journal, 117 (517), F11–F51.
Alam, N. and Getubig, M. (2010). Guidelines for establishing and operating
Grameen-style microcredit programs. Based on the practices of Grameen Bank
and the experiences of Grameen Trust and Grameen Foundation Partners. Tech-
nical report, Grameen Foundation.
Albert, J. H. and Chib, S. (1993). Bayesian analysis of binary and polychoto-
mous response data. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88 (422),
669–679.
Banerjee, A., Besley, T. and Guinnane, T. (1994). Thy neighbor’s keeper:
The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 109 (2), 491–515.
—, Duflo, E., Ghatak, M. and Lafortune, J. (2013). Marry for what?
Caste and mate selection in modern India. American Economic Journal: Mi-
croeconomics, 5 (2), 33–72.
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and
social collateral. Journal of Development Economics, 46 (1), 1–18.
34 References
Bresnahan, T. and Reiss, P. (1991). Empirical models of discrete games. Jour-
nal of Econometrics, 48 (1-2), 57–81.
Brock, W. and Durlauf, S. (2007). Identification of binary choice models with
social interactions. Journal of Econometrics, 140 (1), 52–75.
Cassar, A. and Wydick, B. (2010). Does social capital matter? Evidence
from a five-country group lending experiment. Oxford Economic Papers, 62 (4),
715–739.
Che, Y.-K. and Yoo, S.-W. (2001). Optimal incentives for teams. The American
Economic Review, 91 (3), 525–541.
Chen, J. (2013). Estimation of the loan spread equation with endogenous bank-
firm matching. Advances in Econometrics, 3, 251–289.
Ciliberto, F. and Tamer, E. (2009). Market structure and multiple equilibria
in airline markets. Econometrica, 77 (6), 1791–1828.
Eeckhout, J. and Munshi, K. (2010). Matching in informal financial institu-
tions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 (5), 947–988.
Fafchamps, M. and Gubert, F. (2007). The formation of risk sharing networks.
Journal of Development Economics, 83 (2), 326–350.
Gangopadhyay, S., Ghatak, M. and Lensink, R. (2005). Joint liability lend-
ing and the peer selection effect. The Economic Journal, 115 (506), 1005–1015.
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal
of Development Economics, 60 (1), 27–50.
— (2000). Screening by the company you keep: Joint liability lending and the
peer selection effect. The Economic Journal, 110 (465), 601–631.
Gine´, X., Jakiela, P., Karlan, D. and Morduch, J. (2010). Microfinance
games. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (3), 60–95.
Gordon, N. and Knight, B. (2009). A spatial merger estimator with an appli-
cation to school district consolidation. Journal of Public Economics, 93 (5-6),
752–765.
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica,
47 (1), 153–161.
References 35
Hermes, N. and Lensink, R. (2007). The empirics of microfinance: What do
we know? The Economic Journal, 117 (517), F1–F10.
Holmstro¨m, B. and Tirole, J. (1997). Financial intermediation, loanable
funds, and the real sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (3), 663–691.
Karlan, D. (2007). Social connections and group banking. The Economic Jour-
nal, 117 (517), F52–F84.
Karlson, K. B., Holm, A. and Breen, R. (2012). Comparing regression co-
efficients between same-sample nested models using logit and probit: A new
method. Sociological Methodology, 42 (1), 286–313.
Katzur, T. and Lensink, R. (2012). Group lending with correlated project
outcomes. Economics Letters, 117 (2), 445–447.
Klein, T. (2015a). Analysis of stable matchings in R: Package matchingMar-
kets. Vignette to R package matchingMarkets, The Comprehensive R Archive
Network.
— (2015b). matchingMarkets: Structural estimators and algorithms for the analy-
sis of stable matchings. R package version 0.1-5, The Comprehensive R Archive
Network.
Klonner, S. (2006). Risky Loans and the Emergence of Rotating Savings and
Credit Associations. Working paper, Cornell University.
Laffont, J.-J. (2003). Collusion and group lending with adverse selection. Jour-
nal of Development Economics, 70 (2), 329–348.
Mosley, P. (1986). Risk, insurance and small farm credit in developing countries:
A policy proposal. Public Administration and Development, 6 (3), 309–319.
Park, M. (2013). Understanding merger incentives and outcomes in the mutual
fund industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37 (11), 4368–4380.
Pycia, M. (2012). Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition
formation. Econometrica, 80 (1), 323–362.
Roth, A. E. (2008). What have we learned from market design? The Economic
Journal, 118 (527), 285–310.
36 References
Sharma, M. and Zeller, M. (1997). Repayment performance in group-based
credit programs in Bangladesh: An empirical analysis. World Development,
25 (10), 1731–1742.
Sørensen, M. (2007). How smart is smart money? A two-sided matching model
of venture capital. The Journal of Finance, 62 (6), 2725–2762.
Stiglitz, J. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. The World Bank Eco-
nomic Review, 4 (3), 351–366.
— and Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review, 71 (3), 393–410.
Townsend, R. (1997a). Townsend Thai Project Initial Bank for Agriculture and
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) Survey, 1997. Tech. rep., Murray Research
Archive.
— (1997b). Townsend Thai Project Initial Household Survey, 1997. Tech. rep.,
Murray Research Archive.
— (2000a). Townsend Thai Project Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Coop-
eratives (BAAC) Annual Resurvey, 2000. Tech. rep., Murray Research Archive.
— (2000b). Townsend Thai Project Household Annual Resurvey, 2000. Tech. rep.,
Murray Research Archive.
Weese, E. (2015). Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the
Heisei municipal amalgamations. Quantitative Economics, 6 (2), 257–307.
Wydick, B. (1999). Can social cohesion be harnessed to repair market failures?
Evidence from group lending in Guatemala. The Economic Journal, 109 (457),
463–475.
Zeller, M. (1998). Determinants of repayment performance in credit groups:
The role of program design, intragroup risk pooling, and social cohesion. Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change, 46 (3), 599–620.
Zellner, A. (1986). On assessing prior distributions and Bayesian regression
analysis with g-prior distributions, North-Holland, Amsterdam, vol. 6, pp. 233–
243.
Appendix 37
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Denote by p˜ the average success probability of borrowers
with risk type p ∈ [p, pˆ] who would take a loan at contract terms (r, q) and form
groups with project covariation .
p˜ =
∫ pˆ
p
s g(s) ds
G(pˆ)
(A1)
This is the expression for the expectation of a truncated distribution with proba-
bility density function g(·) and cumulative distribution function G(·). Making use
of the selection equation Eqn 2, the expected repayment y˜ of this borrower pool
can be written as
y˜ = r
∫ pˆ
p
s g(s) ds
G(pˆ)
+ q
∫ pˆ
p
s(1− s) g(s) ds
G(pˆ)
− q (A2)
= (r + q)
∫ pˆ
p
s g(s) ds
G(pˆ)
− q
∫ pˆ
p
s2 g(s) ds
G(pˆ)
− q. (A3)
Using Leibniz integral rule, quotient rule and the fact that
∫ pˆ
p
s2g(s)ds = (p˜2 +
σ˜2p)G(pˆ), where σ˜
2
p is the variance of the success probability in the borrower pool,
we can write the marginal effect of project covariation on expected repayment as
∂y˜
∂
= (r + q)
pˆg(pˆ)
G(pˆ)
(
1− p˜
pˆ
)
∂pˆ
∂
− q pˆ
2g(pˆ)
G(pˆ)
(
1− p˜
2 + σ˜2p
pˆ2
)
∂pˆ
∂
− q. (A4)
From Eqn 2 we know that ∂pˆ/∂ = q/[r + q(1− 2pˆ)]. Substituting, setting p = 0
(without loss of generality) and assuming p to be from a uniform distribution7
yields
∂y˜
∂
=
1
2
(r + q)
q
r + q(1− 2pˆ) −
2
3
qpˆ
q
r + q(1− 2pˆ) − q (A5)
=
1
6
q
[
2qpˆ
r + q(1− 2pˆ) − 3
]
< 0 ⇔ pˆ < 3
8
q + r
q
. (A6)
This implies that project covariation strictly reduces expected repayment if either
(i) pˆ < 3/4 or (ii) q/r < 3/5. Consider these results one at a time. For (i), note
that, for q > 0, ∂y˜/∂ is strictly increasing in joint liability payment q which is
7This implies that p˜ = 12 (pˆ + p) =
1
2 pˆ, σ˜
2
p =
1
12 (pˆ
2 − p)2 = 112 pˆ2, g(pˆ) = 1/[1 − p] = 1, and
G(pˆ) =
pˆ−p
1−p = pˆ.
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bounded from above at r. It therefore suffices to analyse the case where q = r for
which straightforward calculation (using Eqn A6) results in ∂y˜/∂ < 0⇔ pˆ < 3/4.
Similarly, for (ii), since ∂y˜/∂ is increasing in pˆ it suffices to state the condition
for pˆ close to 1.8 In this case, we have ∂y˜/∂ < 0⇔ q/r < 3/5.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The proof of this corollary follows directly from Eqn A4
in the proof of Proposition 3.1. The cross partial derivative ∂
∂g(pˆ)
(
∂y˜
∂
)
= ∂
2y˜
∂g(pˆ)∂
is
positive if
(r + q)
pˆ
∂G(pˆ)
∂g(pˆ)
(
1− p˜
pˆ
)
∂pˆ
∂
> q
pˆ2
∂G(pˆ)
∂g(pˆ)
(
1− p˜
2 + σ˜2p
pˆ2
)
∂pˆ
∂
(A7)
(r + q)
(
1− p˜
pˆ
)
> qpˆ
(
1− p˜
2 + σ˜2p
pˆ2
)
(A8)
(r + q)(pˆ− p˜) > q(pˆ2 − p˜2)− qσ˜2p. (A9)
It can be checked that, for q ≤ r and pˆ > p˜, it holds that (r+q)(pˆ− p˜) > q(pˆ2− p˜2)
and therefore the above inequality is satisfied for all parameter constellation in
Ghatak (1999). The condition q ≤ r is an incentive compatibility constraint. The
rationale behind this constraint is that if joint-liability q were to exceed interest
payment r, the borrower with the successful project would prefer to announce
success and pay interest r < q instead of the full joint-liability payment (Gan-
gopadhyay et al., 2005).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The starting point of the proof are two identical, haz-
ardous projects L and M between which borrowers are indifferent.
V
L−M = VL − VM (A10)
= [p2
H
+ ] · U
H
+ [p
H
(1− p
H
)− ] · U
Hq
(A11)
−[p2
H
+ ] · U
H
− [p
H
(1− p
H
)− ] · U
Hq
= 0.
Now consider an increase in  for both projects. How much safer can the first
project be made in response when (i) the risk-return ratio is fixed at dy/dp and (ii)
the borrowers are to be held indifferent between the safer and the risky project?
Taking the total differential with respect to  for both projects and allowing a
8Note that for pˆ = 1 we have ∂pˆ/∂ = 0 because p ∈ [p, 1] and thus ∂y˜/∂ = −q < 0 from
Eqn A4.
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simultaneous change in p and y for the first project yields:
dV
L−M = (UH − UHq) · d+ [(UH − UHq) · 2pH + UHq ] · dp
+[(p2
H
+ ) · U ′
H
+ (p
H
(1− p
H
)− ) · U ′
Hq
] · dy
dp
· dp
+(U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
) · dy · d+ [(U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
) · 2p
H
+ U ′
Hq
] · dy · dp
−(U
H
− U
Hq
) · d, (A12)
where U ′k = ∂Uk/∂y. Setting dVL−M = 0 holds the borrower indifferent between
the two projects and yields the rate by which an increase in correlation results in
a safer project choice, for given level of dy and risk-return ratio dy/dp.
dp/d =
{
− (U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
)dy
}
/
{
(U
H
− U
Hq
)2p
H
+ U
Hq
+ [(U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
)2p
H
+ U ′
Hq
]dy
}
{
+ [(U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
)(p2
H
+ ) + U ′
Hq
p
H
]
dy
dp
}
.
The expected repayment to the bank is
Y = r · p
H
+ q · [p
H
(1− p
H
)− ]. (A13)
Taking the total differential w.r.t. p and  yields
dY = (r + q(1− 2p
H
)) · dp− q · d (A14)
dY
d
= (r + q(1− 2p
H
)) · dp
d
− q. (A15)
Substituting dp/d from Eqn A13 above into Eqn A15 gives the marginal repay-
ment effect of correlated returns as
dY/d =
{
(r + q(1− 2p
H
))(U ′
Hq
− U ′
H
)dy
}
/
{
(U
H
− U
Hq
)2p
H
+ U
Hq
}
{
+ [(U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
)2p
H
+ U ′
Hq
]dy + [(U ′
H
− U ′
Hq
)(p2
H
+ ) + U ′
Hq
p
H
]
dy
dp
}
− q.
Observe that there are two situations in which the marginal repayment effect is
strictly negative. First, if borrowers are risk neutral or moderately risk averse such
that U ′Hq ≈ U ′H then dY/d = −q < 0. In this case, utility is close to linear and
correlation has no effect on decision between projects but a strictly negative effect
from anti-diversification. The second case is when dy goes towards zero. Then
dY/d = −q < 0 because the income level at which the utility gain from avoiding
liability payment (due to increased project correlation) is evaluated – and thus
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the slope of the utility – is similar for safe and risky projects.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Part (i) of the proposition is trivial. For part (ii), note
that the matching pattern in Figure 2c is an equilibrium under aligned preferences
if the safest risk type in group L, denoted by k, prefers to remain matched with
group member j′ over a swap of j′ for borrower i′ from group M , i.e. if uk,j′ > uk,i′ .
This is the case for  > pk(pi′ − pj′). If this inequality holds for marginal type k,
then any borrower x in L prefers j′ over i′ (because px < pk and net utility in Eqn
5 is decreasing in p). Thus, preferences are aligned within the leading exposure
type A for the dominant group L and the matching is stable.
The condition for aligned preferences is satisfied if exposure intensity  is suf-
ficiently large and the difference pi′ − pj′ is sufficiently small. The latter term is
decreasing in the proportion of the leading exposure type. To see this, note that
the integral over the probability density function of risk type p below must equal
1/2 in the case with two groups per market.
θA
∫ pj′
pi′
fp(t) dt =
1
2
(A16)
Here, the integral is pre-multiplied with the proportion of A-types, θA, because, by
Assumption H1, the proportion is constant for any point in the distribution of p.
Now, fix any distribution of risk types, fp, and note that the higher the proportion
of A-types, θA, in the market the higher the value of pj′ , the lowest risk type in
group L. Thus the smaller is the difference pi′− pj′ . Graphically, in Figure 2b, for
any distribution of risk types, the more A-type borrowers, the smaller the term
pi′ − pj′ .
Proof of Corollary 3.2. To begin with, under Assumption H1 both groups M and
L have the same group project correlation and L has safer risk types than M (see
Figure 2b). An i-for-j swap has two effects.
First, it results in an increase in project covariation for group L and a decrease
for group M . To see this, note that the total differential of Eqn 6 with respect
to ns is q
∑
s∈{A,B}(2ns − 1)dns. For an i-for-j swap in group L we have dnA =
+1 and dnB = −1, which results in an increase in group project correlation of
2q(nA − nB) > 0, where the sign of the inequality results from the fact that
nA > nB. Conversely, for group M , setting dnA = −1 and dnB = +1 we observe
a decrease in group project correlation by 2q(nB − nA) < 0.9
9After several A-for-B swaps, group M may eventually have more B-types than A-types, i.e.
nMB > n
M
A (see Figure 2c) and project correlation increases. However, the correlation of L still
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Second, such a swap increases the average riskiness of types in group L but
never makes L riskier than M on average. It follows that sorting induces a positive
correlation between the two dimensions.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. A matching is stable if deviation is unattractive. Alter-
native matches are therefore bound to have a lower valuation than observed ones.
Specifically, the valuation of an unmatched group G must be smaller than the
maximum valuation of the equilibrium matches µ(i) that its members i belong
to. If G’s valuation was larger, then its members would block their equilibrium
matches to form the new coalition G. We thus have an upper bound VG for the
valuation of G /∈ µ˜.
G /∈ µ˜ ⇔ VG < max
i∈G
Vµ(i) =: VG (A17)
For the if direction (⇒) assume for contradiction that G is a blocking coalition
for µ. Per the definition of blocking coalitions, this implies that all agents in this
coalition prefer being matched to each other over being matched to their current
partners in µ, i.e., G i µ(i) ∀i ∈ G. Given aligned preferences, the condition
implies that VG > Vµ(i) ∀i ∈ G. Together this implies that VG > maxi∈G Vµ(i),
which contradicts the assumption in the proposition.
For the only if direction (⇐) assume µ to be a stable matching with G /∈ µ.
Since by stability G is not a blocking coalition, it must hold that there is at
least one individual i that prefers its equilibrium group µ(i) over group G, i.e.
∃ i ∈ G : µ(i) i G. Given aligned preferences, this condition implies that
∃ i ∈ G : Vµ(i) > VG. Together these conditions imply that VG < maxi∈G Vµ(i),
which is the upper bound condition from the proposition.
Following the same logic as above, the valuation of a matched group G must be
larger than the maximum valuation of the feasible deviations of its group members.
Feasible deviations of G’s group members are such that they are attractive to those
borrowers outside of group G that are necessary to form these new matches. That
is, feasible deviations are such that their value is larger than the maximum valu-
ation of the equilibrium groups that the non-group-G members of that deviating
group belong to.
G ∈ µ˜ ⇔ VG > max
G′′∈S
VG′′ =: VG (A18)
Here, S is the set of feasible deviations from G, defined as S(G) := {G′ ∈
grows at a faster rate.
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G|G′ ∩ G /∈ {∅, G}, VG′ > maxi∈G′\GVµ(i)}. That is, a deviation from G to G′
is feasible for all new non-G borrowers in G′ if the valuation of G′ is larger than
the maximum that new borrowers would receive in their equilibrium match, i.e. if
VG′ > maxi∈G′\GVµ(i). The set of new borrowers are those borrowers in G′ that do
not belong to the original equilibrium match G, i.e. those in G′\G.
For the only if direction (⇐) assume µ to be a stable matching with G ∈ µ.
Since µ is stable, no member of G can benefit from deviating. Given aligned
preferences, for any member i ∈ G this implies that VG > VG′ ∀G′ ∈ S, where S
is the set of feasible deviations for group members of G. Together this implies the
inequality VG > maxG′∈S VG′ in the proposition.
For the if direction (⇒) assume that the inequalities in the proposition hold.
Let G be a match in µ. It follows from the inequalities in the proposition that no
member of G can be part of a blocking coalition.
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B Simulation of posterior distribution
The Bayesian estimator uses the data augmentation approach (proposed by Albert
and Chib, 1993) that treats the latent outcome and valuation variables as nuissance
parameters.
Conditional posterior distribution of outcome variables
The outcome equation is defined (and observed) for realised matches, G ∈ µ,
only. For binary outcome variables, when the observed outcome YG equals one,
the conditional distribution of the latent outcome variable Y ∗G is truncated from
below at zero as N (XGβ + (VG −WGα)δ, 1) with density
P(Y ∗G|V, Y ∗−G, θ, Y, µ,W,X) = C · 1 [Y ∗G ≥ 0]
·exp{−0.5 (Y ∗G −XGβ − (VG −WGα)δ)2} .
When YG equals zero, the distribution is the same but now truncated from above
at zero. In markets with one group only, the term (VG−WGα)δ is dropped because
VG, α and δ need not be estimated in this case. When an offset is used in the
estimation, the distributions are truncated at minus the group-specific offset value
instead of zero.
Conditional posterior distribution of valuation variables
For unobserved matches, G /∈ µ, the distribution of the latent valuation variable
is N (WGα, 1), truncated from above at VG with density
P(VG|V−G, Y ∗, θ, Y, µ,X,W ) = C · 1
[
VG ≤ VG
]
·exp{−0.5(VG −WGα)2} .
For observed matches, G ∈ µ, the conditional distribution of the latent valuation
variable is truncated from below at VG asN
(
WGα + (Y
∗
G −XGβ)δ/(σ2ξ + δ2), σ2ξ/(σ2ξ + δ2)
)
with density
P(VG|V−G, Y ∗, θ, Y, µ,X,W ) = C · 1
[
VG ≥ VG
] · exp{−0.5(VG
−WGα− (Y
∗
G −XGβ)δ
σ2ξ + δ
2
)2
· σ
2
ξ + δ
2
σ2ξ
}
.
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The variance of σ2ξ/(σ
2
ξ + δ
2) for the valuation variables is chosen such that the
variance of the error term in the selection equation, σ2η, equals one.
10
Conditional posterior distribution of parameters
Alpha
The coefficient vector α in the selection equation is only estimated for the subset
of markets with two borrower groups. This subset is denoted by T2 and, together
with the set of one-group markets T1, makes the total set of markets T . The
conditional posterior of α is N
(
αˆ, Σˆα
)
, where
Σˆα =
Σ−1α +∑
t∈T2
∑
G/∈µt
W ′GWG +
∑
G∈µt
σ2ξ + δ
2
σ2ξ
W ′GWG
−1 (A19)
and
αˆ = −Σˆα
−Σ−1α α¯ +∑
t∈T2
∑
G/∈µt
−W ′GVG
+
∑
G∈µt
σ2ξ + δ
2
σ2ξ
W ′G
(
VG − (Y
∗
G −XGβ)δ
σ2ξ + δ
2
)]]
(A20)
The variables Σ−1α and Σ
−1
α α¯ are constants given the priors. In the estimation, I
chose the priors α¯ = 0|α|,1 and Σα = 10 · I|α|, where 0n1,n2 is the zero matrix of
dimension n1×n2 and In is the identity matrix of dimension n. The values of the
two constants are therefore Σ−1α = (10 · I|α|)−1 and Σ−1α α¯ = 0|α|,|α| respectively.
Beta
Similarly, the conditional posterior distribution of β is N
(
βˆ, Σˆβ
)
, where
Σˆβ =
[
Σ−1β +
∑
t∈T1
∑
G∈µt
1
σ2ξ
X ′GXG +
∑
t∈T2
∑
G∈µt
1
σ2ξ
X ′GXG
]−1
(A21)
10σ2η = var(
εδ
σ2ξ+δ
2 + x) =
(σ2ξ+δ
2)δ2
(σ2ξ+δ
2)2
+ σ2x =
δ2
(σ2ξ+δ
2)
+ σ2x. So σ
2
η = 1 iff σ
2
x = σ
2
ξ/(σ
2
ξ + δ
2).
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and
βˆ = −Σˆβ
[
−Σ−1β β¯ −
∑
t∈T1
∑
G∈µt
1
σ2ξ
X ′GY
∗
G
−
∑
t∈T2
∑
G∈µt
1
σ2ξ
X ′G(Y
∗
G − δ(VG −WGα))
]
. (A22)
Here, the values of the two constants are Σ−1β = (10 · I|β|)−1 and Σ−1β β¯ = 0|β|,|β|
respectively.
Delta
Finally, for δ the posterior is N(δˆ, σˆ2δ ), with
σˆ2δ =
[
1
σ2δ
+
∑
t∈T2
∑
G∈µt
1
σ2ξ
(VG −WGα)2
]−1
(A23)
and
δˆ = −σˆ2δ
[
− δ¯
σ2δ
−
∑
t∈T2
∑
G∈µt
1
σ2ξ
(Y ∗G −XGβ)(VG −WGα)
]
. (A24)
Analogously, the values of the two constants are 1
σ2δ
= 1
10
and δ¯
σ2δ
= 0.
46 Appendix
C Replication Guide11
The results reported herein are fully replicable using the knitr literate program-
ming engine in the R open-source software environment for statistical computing.
R packages used are: foreign, knitr, matchingMarkets, reshape, survival,
tseries.
C.1 Data sources and preparation
All files for replication are in the inputs/ folder. Documentation and original
data used in the paper are in inputs/rawdata/ and can be directly downloaded
in zip format from the Harvard Dataverse:
• 1997 BAAC survey (study 10676) at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/10676
• 1997 Household survey (study 10672) at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/10672
• 2000 BAAC survey (study 12057) at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12057
• 2000 Household survey (study 10935) at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/10935
These files are preprocessed using the script in code/1-0-data-preparation.R
and the cleaned and transformed data is written to the inputs/data/ folder for
analysis.
C.1.1 Group-level variables
I start the preprocessing with the 1997 group-level data in Ahlin and Townsend
(2007). This data is not used in the analysis because it lacks individual-level
information. It serves two purposes: First, it allows me to verify the correct
implementation of the variable transformations in Ahlin and Townsend (2007)
which are subsequently applied to the 2000 group-level data in this paper. Second,
information on the borrower group age in the 1997 data is used to impute this
missing variable in the 2000 data.
C.1.2 Regression imputation of group age
The imputation proceeds in three steps. In the first step, a regression model that
explains group age is estimated. This model combines data from the Bank for
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) 1997 and 2000 surveys in an
11This section of the Appendix is not intended for publication.
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interval regression. While the group age is not observed in the BAAC 2000 data,
the quasi-panel still allows me to find bounds for a group’s age (see Table A1 for a
summary). Note first that groups from villages that only had a single group in the
BAAC 1997 can be no older than this group’s age in the BAAC 1997 survey plus
three. Furthermore, for all other villages we know that the log-age of groups in the
BAAC 2000 survey can be no larger than 34 (= 2000− 1966) because the BAAC
started its group lending operations in 1966. Finally the BAAC 2000 contains a
group history of events such as the admission of new members or the assistance
members provided to their peers. The first event documented in this history sets
a lower bound on a group’s age, which is otherwise bounded from below at 1.
Table A1: Definition of bounds for interval regression of the missing group age
variable
Groups from lower bound upper bound
BAAC 1997 survey group age97 group age97
BAAC 2000 survey
- in villages with single group in ’97 max{group hist00, 1} max age97+3
- in all other villages max{group hist00, 1} 2000-1966
The results of the interval regression are presented in Table A2 below. The in-
dependent variables are explained in Table 2. PCG membership is a village-level
variable that gives the percentage of the village population that is a member of a
production credit group. Intuitively, we would expect to find less mature groups
in a village were PCG membership is prevalent because this may indicate that
BAAC operations in that village started more recently. The expected effect of
other variables follows similar reasoning. For example, both group size and loan
size are expected to be associated with higher group age simply because groups
tend to attract new members as they mature and the loan size typically increases
for more mature borrowers.
In the second step, the model above is used to predict the group age for groups
in the BAAC 2000 data. In the final step, the uncertainty is reintroduced into
the imputations by adding the prediction error into the regression. This is done
by adding the working residuals of the interval regression model to the predicted
values. The result is plotted in Figures A1a and A1b below where the predicted
values are on the straight line; dots represent the original BAAC 1997 data and
circles depict the imputed data.
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The validity of the imputations is tested by comparing the imputed group age
to the upper and lower bounds in Table A1. The fact that the predictions remain
well within the bounds for all 68 groups in the BAAC 2000 data gives us some
confidence in the model.
C.1.3 Borrower-level variables
Borrower-level variables are constructed based on the 2000 BAAC survey and the
combined borrower and group level data is in data/borrower-level.RData.
C.1.4 Matching data
The core part of the data preparation is the generation of group characteristics
based on borrower-level variables for both factual and counterfactual groups. This
is implemented and documented in function stabit in R package matchingMarkets
(Klein, 2015b). The resulting group-level data is in data/group-level.RData.
C.2 Descriptive statistics, models and simulations
The R code in inputs/code/ for descriptive statistics, econometrics and simula-
tion results is commented and can be run independently to obtain all results in
figures, tables and text in the paper. The code is annotated with tags of the form
## ---- label:, which allow the identification of the section in sections/ that
a code chunk is called from in the LATEX document. To see how results from the
R code are embedded in the paper, see the .Rnw files whose file names correspond
directly to the tag of the code chunk in the R script.
The estimator developed in this paper is implemented in the R package and
the source code available on the Comprehensive R Archive Network. To test
the functionality of the software implementation in this package, Klein (2015a)
provides simulation evidence of the correct implementation of both design matrix
generation and estimators.
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Table A2: Interval regression imputation of the missing group age variable
S.E. in parentheses; significance at 0.1, 1, 5, 10% denoted
by ***, **, *, and . respectively.
Interval regression
Dependent variable as defined in Table A1.
Intercept 1.451 (0.497) **
ln(group size) 0.871 (0.118) ***
loan size 0.005 (0.006) .
loan size sqrd -0.000 (0.000) .
average land 0.007 (0.002) **
average education -0.548 (0.135) ***
PCG membership -0.631 (0.276) *
BAAC 2000 (ref: 1997) 0.371 (0.125) **
ln(scale) -0.332 (0.043) ***
Observations 306
R2 0.245
LR-test, Pr(> χ27) 1e–14
Figure A1: Comparison of distributions of original group age variable in BAAC
1997 (dots) and random regression imputation of missing BAAC 2000 group age
variable (circles)
(a) Actual observations (dots) and re-
gression imputations (circles) plotted
against fitted values
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(b) Actual residuals (dots) and imputed
residuals (circles) plotted against fitted
values
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